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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This brief discusses the history of the criminalization of homelessness. Specifically, this
brief explores historical criminalization laws and the framework created for modern antihomeless ordinances. This brief’s section on historical criminalization laws will explore the
impetus for their creation, their effects, and ultimately the reasons for their repeal. Next, modern
anti-homeless ordinances are analyzed through three modern case studies. Finally, historical
criminalization laws and modern anti-homeless ordinances are compared, revealing their
similarities in form, function, and phrasing. These similarities should lead to the repeal of
modern anti-homeless ordinances: a similar fate of historical criminalization laws.
Historical exclusion laws targeted groups to exclude them from public space. The following are
examples of exclusion laws and their purposes:
 Laws were created in England and early colonial America to protect “public space” from
disreputable individuals.1
 Warning-out was a process by which colonial towns could exclude people from
communities by preventing them (if they thought they were going to be a welfare burden)
from obtaining residence if they could not prove either financial self-sufficiency and/or
familial heritage to the community.2
 The English government adopted increasingly punitive vagrancy laws directed against
wandering, unemployed indigents.3
 Elizabethan poor laws gave power to cities over the daily lives of the poor.
 The great migration to the West, during the Dust Bowl, gave rise to the term “Okie” and
created a negative connotation as Western states felt the burden of an excess population.4
 In the case of sundown towns, these laws were meant to keep minorities—often times
African American, Chinese American, or Hispanics—from residing in the town.5
 The United States Supreme Court struck down vagrancy and loitering laws as
impermissibly vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
 Although many states were encouraged to overturn, repeal, or discontinue enforcement of
these laws without intervention from the Supreme Court or Congress, the process was
slow to conclude.6
Modern anti-homeless ordinances seem to be a response to the repeal of historical exclusion
laws, but still function in the same manner:

1

Sandra Wachholz, Hate Crimes Against the Homeless: Warning-Out New England Style, JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
(Dec. 2005).
2
Id.
3
Harry Simon, Towns Without Pity: A Constitutional and Historical Analysis of Official Efforts to Drive Homeless
Persons From American Cities, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 631 (1992).
4
DONALD WORSTER, DUST BOWL—THE SOUTHERN PLAINS IN THE 1930S, 50 (25th Anniversary ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 2004) (other terms for Okies including “Arkies” or “Texies”).
5
Tom I. Romero, II, No Brown Towns: Anti-Immigrant Ordinances and Equality of Educational Opportunity for
Latina/os, 12 J. Gender Race & Just. 13, 30-32 (2008).
6
Marcia Pearce Burgdorf & Robert Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of
Handicapped Persons as a Suspect Class Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855 (1975)
(stating that many ugly laws were not repealed until the 1970s and the latest were still in effect until 1974).
AND SOCIAL WELFARE, VOL. XXXII, NUM. 4, 141
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The repeal of historical vagrancy and group-specific exclusion laws led to the creation of
more detailed modern conduct-specific ordinances.
The removal of homeless individuals from a city’s public spaces as a policy goal was
largely influenced by the Broken Windows theory.
Modern criminalization ordinances afford law enforcement similar discretion as was
afforded under the historical vagrancy/group-specific exclusion laws.
In form and function, modern criminalization ordinances are similar to historical
exclusion laws that society has already rejected on legal and policy grounds.
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INTRODUCTION

The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.7
The criminalization of homelessness is an issue that affects cities and counties across the
United States. The past decade has seen a drastic increase in the number of homeless people in
cities across the country.8 Due to the increase of homeless people, many cities are finding it
difficult to assist them.9 The visibility of homelessness in cities has led to attempts to decrease
the visible presence of homeless people10 by criminalizing the conduct of “life-sustaining
activities” in public.11 These criminalization laws impact the living conditions of America’s
homeless population, many of whom are “socially isolated[] and are part of no community.”12
The targeted exclusion of specific marginalized groups in general is much older than
modern efforts. Modern criminalization laws find their roots in English and colonial vagrancy
laws.13 Vagrancy laws punished vagrants—people who travelled from city-to-city without
money or a job—for fear they would burden the state by requiring extreme welfare and inviting
lawlessness to enter the town.14 These laws worked to give local authorities the right to banish
people from sharing space.
Beyond colonial vagrancy laws, current anti-homeless ordinances share similarities with
other historical exclusion laws. Some historical exclusion laws subjugated African-Americans
and controlled where they could sit, stand, or visit.15 During the Dust Bowl era of the earlytwentieth century, migrant farmers from the plains states were prohibited from entering states
like California and Washington.16 Finally, people with physical disabilities were punished for
appearing in public spaces in the twentieth century.17 These examples reveal the history of
exclusion in the United States.
The fight to control public space drives the creation of many of the modern
criminalization laws against the homeless. This brief defines public space as “all areas that are
open and accessible to all members of the public in a society, in principle though not necessarily
in practice.”18 The struggle to control public spaces is seen in the implementation of historical
7

ANATOLE FRANCE, LE LYS ROUGE [THE RED LILY] (Nabu Press 2010).
NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN
U.S. CITIES (2014) [hereinafter NAT’L LAW CTR.], available at http://nlchp.org/documents/No_Safe_Place.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1559 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (the court defining life-sustaining activities
as including eating, sleeping, and sitting).
12
Id. at 1553.
13
Simon, supra note 3, at 635.
14
Wachholz, supra note 1, at 141.
15
See C. VANN WOODARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (Oxford Univ. Press 1974).
16
WORSTER, supra note 4.
17
Susan Schweik, Kicked to the Curb: Ugly Law Then and Now, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2012).
18
ANTHONY M. ORUM & ZACHARY P. NEAL, COMMON GROUND? READINGS AND REFLECTIONS ON PUBLIC SPACE
(THE METROPOLIS AND MODERN LIFE) (Routledge 2009).
8
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exclusion laws. Each of these laws worked to exclude many groups of individuals that were
deemed undesirable by people in control. Some of these laws specifically stated that certain
people had to leave towns and cities. Many local authorities hid behind ancient duties that they
believed they owed to residents to control space and its accessibility.
Current anti-homeless ordinances seek to criminalize the basic human life-sustaining
conduct of homeless people and in turn, limit their accessibility to public spaces.19 This conduct,
however, is not in and of itself criminal. The attribution of the conduct to homeless people,
however, has made the acts—sitting, eating, or sleeping in public spaces—punishable.20 By
punishing these acts, local authorities are controlling public spaces much like the local
authorities that enforced historical exclusion laws did.
This brief illustrates and analyzes select historical exclusion laws like the ones stated
above to show why today’s criminalization of homelessness is not new, and also seeks to
understand why states like Washington and cities like Seattle criminalize homelessness. The
brief opens with a survey of historical criminalization laws and discusses how the underlying
rationale for these historical laws was control over public space. Next, this brief examines the
shift from historical criminalization laws to modern anti-homeless ordinances by highlighting
case studies of homeless criminalization practices from around the country, illuminating
examples of criminalization ordinances and how they target homeless people. Finally, this brief
ends by exploring the similarities between historical criminalization laws and modern antihomeless ordinances, showing how the similarities in form, function, and phrasing of these two
types of laws should compel society to reject anti-homeless ordinances just like historical
exclusion laws.
I. HISTORICAL EXCLUSION LAWS
The trend to punish homeless people’s “life-sustaining activities” has received a recent
push by many cities; laws of this nature are not new. Laws punishing conduct existed in the
United States as far back as the original colonies.21 These conduct-punishing laws, however,
historically focused on specific groups in the United States. These laws, when compared to
modern anti-homeless ordinances, show a repeated effort to exclude groups from participating in
public space. This section looks at historical criminalization laws in the United States and
analyzes how these laws came to be, their effects, and ultimately, how they were overturned.
A. Vagrancy Laws
Many of today’s laws criminalizing homelessness stem from colonial vagrancy laws that
were adopted from England.22 In the fourteenth century, England’s population suffered massive

19

NAT’L LAW CTR, supra note 8.
Don Mitchell, The Annihilation of Space Law: The Roots and Implications of Homeless Laws in the United States,
29 ANTIPODE 305 (1997).
21
Simon, supra note 3, at 635.
22
Id.
20
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deaths and economic struggles after the Black Death.23 In response, the English government
enacted statutes to help the economy.24
During the fourteenth century, England enacted the Statute of Labourers that “confined
the laboring population to stated places of abode, and required them to work at specified rates of
wages.”25 The Statute confined workers to specific locations and punished people who decided to
wander in search of jobs. It made being a “vagabond” or vagrant punishable because “it was seen
as desertion.”26 The punishment stemming from this statute ensured that the movement of the
poor would be limited and controlled.27
Colonial America adopted much of the Statute of Labourers.28 The American version of
this law became known as the vagrancy law. These vagrancy laws, much like the Statute of
Labourers, limited the movement of poor people from town to town. Most of the time, these
vagrancy laws were known as “warning-out laws” by local authorities. These laws empowered
local colonial authorities to notify new people in town that they would have to leave.29 New town
arrivals would be presented with a note that would read in part, “In the name of the Government
and the people…you are hereby required…to depart out of this town immediately and no longer
make it the place of [your] residence.”30
Many towns in colonial America used these notices to protect themselves from economic
instability.31 In order to protect the town, local authorities relied on the argument that a duty
arose to protect the residents of town.32 Therefore, many local authorities pushed new people out
because these newcomers could potentially cause an economic burden on the town, burden
residents, and make it difficult for local authorities to carry out their duty.33
Warning-out laws served two purposes for colonial towns. First, these laws served to
determine who could obtain jobs in colonial towns.34 Local authorities ensured that only town
residents could obtain jobs by requiring that newcomers leave the town after being warned-out.35
The second purpose gave local authorities the legal mechanism to control access to public spaces
within a town. The requirement that people had to establish residency before obtaining a job or
show familial ties to the community to live within the towns’ borders ensured that local
authorities could control who resided within them. This control would prevent vagrants and other
23

Id.
Id. at n. 31.
25
Id.at n. 30.
26
Vagabond was defined as a person who wandered around without home or job. See Simon, supra note 3.
27
Id. at 639.
28
Id. at 636 (stating that war efforts left many soldiers displaced and the dissolution of monasteries had a significant
impact on the homeless population of England).
29
Wachholz, supra note 1.
30
JOSIAH H. BENTON, WARNING OUT IN NEW ENGLAND, 1656-1817,17 (Ulan Press 2012), available at
http://archive.org/details/warningoutinnew00goog.
31
JOAN M. CROUSE, THE HOMELESS TRANSIENT IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION: NEW YORK STATE, 1929-1941, 15
(SUNY Press 1986) (by 1770, every colony except Georgia adopting laws of settlement and removal).
32
BENTON, supra note 30, at 20.
33
Id.
34
Wachholz, supra note 1 (individuals warned-out if viewed as a threat to the supply of waged labor positions).
35
Id. at 143.
24
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people from being able to use services available to residents of the town because towns felt
vagrants did not belong.36
Colonial vagrancy laws continued after the revolution. Many American towns continued
to enact these laws. As towns continued to expand, many states passed Settlement Acts that
expanded on colonial vagrancy laws.37 These acts were used “for the punishment of idle and
disorderly persons, [and] for the support and maintenance of the poor.”38 Many towns and cities
continued to reinforce colonial rights to warn inhabitants out because it was “necessary for a
state to provide precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and
possibly convicts.”39 These acts expanded on local authorities’ powers to evict people and
control the use of public space. Below is a chart showing years that some New England states
enacted warning-out laws or Settlement Acts.
Table A.1 Warning-Out and Settlement Laws40
Name of State
Vermont (Warning-Out)
Massachusetts (Warning-Out)
Connecticut (Settlement)
New Hampshire (Settlement)
Vermont (Settlement)
Maine (Settlement)

Year Law Enacted
1787
1793
1796
1796
1817
1821

B. Anti-Okie Laws41
In the 1930s and 40s, the United States experienced
two drastic events that affected most of the country. First,
1930 saw the end of a nationwide economic surplus and the
beginning of the Great Depression. At its peak, the Great
Depression negatively impacted over a million people.42
Many U.S. citizens were left without jobs or homes resulting
in a rise in the urban homeless population. Second, the plains
states—home to many of the United States’ farmers—

36

Id.
BENTON, supra note 30, at 90.
38
Id. at 100.
39
See Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102 (1837).
40
BENTON, supra note 30.
41
JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH [Cover Art] (1939).
42
Casey Garth Jarvis, Homeless: Critical Solutions to a Dire Problem; Escaping Punitive Approaches By Using a
Human Rights Foundation in the Construction and Enactment of Comprehensive Legislation, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV.
407, 416 n. 104 (2011) (citing to the discussion on the number of homeless individuals during the 1930s. The author
cited various research findings estimating a range of 1 to 5 million homeless individuals in the United States during
this time).
37
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experienced a catastrophic drought.43 Many farmers became displaced and went without work
during this “Dust Bowl.”44 As a result of the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl, many former
farmers travelled west in search of new jobs and homes.45
Many cities in western states experienced an influx of these former farmers that were
now being called Okies.46 From 1935 to 1940, California received more than 250,000 migrants.47
During this time period, more than 70,000 southwesterners migrated to the San Joaquin Valley in
search of farming land.48 The influx of migrants depressed wages and displaced Hispanic and
Filipino workers.49 Unlike these displaced workers who would leave after the harvest was done,
Okies would permanently stay. The Okie presence after the harvest—many living in filth, in
tents and shantytowns along the irrigation ditches—bred a negative sentiment.50
In response to the influx of Okies, many western states passed laws punishing the
presence of Okies as well as those that tried to assist them. In California, one ordinance from
Yuba County provided that “[e]very person, firm or corporation, or officer or agent thereof that
brings or assists in bringing into the State any indigent person who is not a resident of the State,
knowing him to be an indigent person, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”51 While counties passed
ordinances punishing residents who aided migrants, many other counties punished Okies trying
to establish permanent residency in the Western state.
In 1941, the issue of controlling the travel of indigents and Okies came before the
Supreme Court of the United States. The 1930s had seen a net migration of about one million
people in California.52 Employment opportunities in California, however, did not increase to
meet the new demand.53 Increase in migration burdened the social service programs that had
incentivized people to migrate to California.54 In particular, the Farm Security Association
suffered from an increase as Okies burdened the system.55 Counties complained of increases in
education and sanitation costs, and the state experienced an increase in taxes to support all of
these programs.
43

Drought: A Paleo Perspective—20th Century Drought, NATIONAL CLIMATIC DATA CENTER (April 5, 2009)
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/drought/drght_history.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2014).
44
Stephen Loffredo, “If You Ain’t Got the DO, RE, MI”: The Commerce Clause and State Residence Restrictions on
Welfare, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 147 (1993) (“When the drought hit, farmers could no longer produce enough
crops to pay off loans or even pay for essential needs . . . Many farmers were forced off of their land, with one in ten
farms changing possession at the peak of the farm transfers.”).
45
See Stephen Loffredo, “If You Ain’t Got the DO, RE, MI”: The Commerce Clause and State Residence
Restrictions on Welfare, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 147 (1993); DONALD WORSTER, supra note 4.
46
WORSTER, supra note 4 (other terms for Okies including “Arkies” or “Texies”); Ben Reddick, Onetime O.C.
Supervisor, Dies, LA TIMES, Oct. 28, 1997, http://articles.latimes.com/1997/oct/28/news/mn-47602.
47
WILLIAM H. MULLINS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF OKLA, HIST. AND CULTURE, OKIE MIGRATIONS (2009),
http://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php?entry=OK008.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Reddick, supra note 46.
51
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941).
52
Reddick, supra note 46.
53
Mullins, supra note 47.
54
Id.
55
Id.
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In 1941, a man, Edwards, had been charged with violating a California statute that
prohibited residents from knowingly transporting indigents into the state when he helped
transport a homeless and jobless family member into Yuba County.56 In its brief to the Court, the
State pointed to the economic burden placed on the county and the state as a whole with the
influx of Okies.57 The State further wrote that California had an inherent state power to limit
entry into the State because they owed a duty to protect their state residents from economic
disparity.58
The Supreme Court found the state’s actions to be unconstitutional.59 The Court found
that California’s efforts to banish poverty within its borders violated the Commerce Clause and
the basic rights of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”60 Regarding the Commerce
Clause, Justice Brynes wrote that a state could not close its doors to prevent the impact of the
Great Depression.61 By closing its doors, a state would force other states to carry a larger burden
by forcing them to expend more resources on social services.62 The action of one state would
affect other states’ commerce decisions and therefore the act of closing doors to indigents would
violate federal law under the Commerce Clause.63 This act would burden other states that would
be forced to provide for more individuals, creating a burden on interstate commerce.64 Therefore,
in his written opinion, Brynes made poverty a national issue that concerned every state in the
union.65 By finding that poverty was a national issue, the Supreme Court ultimately found antiOkie Laws and their predecessors, Vagrancy Laws, unconstitutional.66
C. Jim Crow Laws
After losing the Civil War, the Southern states were left in economic turmoil and
instability.67 In response to the turmoil and instability, many local governments passed what
would be known as “Jim Crow” laws that aimed to segregate newly freed African-Americans
from public spaces.68 These laws spanned many generations and led local and state authorities to
criminalize African-Americans based on their race alone. This section will focus on the early
judicial rulings validating Jim Crow laws and then look at cases that dismantled Jim Crow laws
to show how the Supreme Court rejected segregation as a rational justification of exclusion.
Jim Crow’s racial segregation began as early as 1876 and lasted until the mid-twentieth
century.69 Jim Crow laws targeted day-to-day activities of African-Americans. The chart below
56

Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 164 (1941).
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 173.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 172.
62
Id.
63
See id. at 173.
64
Id. at 173.
65
Id.
66
See id.
67
WOODARD, supra note 15.
68
Id.
69
Barbara Y. Welke, Beyond Plessy: Space, Status, and Race in the Era of Jim Crow, UTAH L. REV. 267, 268
(2001).
57
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shows examples of laws that prohibited African-Americans from sharing the same public space
as non-African-Americans. The span of these laws shows how states criminalized different
activities and how each used race as a criminalizing factor.
Table C.1 Example of Jim Crow Laws70
Name of State
Alabama

Location or Service Denied
Restaurant

Georgia

Parks

Louisiana

Housing

70

Language of the Law
It shall be unlawful to conduct a
restaurant or other place for the serving
of food in the city, at which white and
colored people are served in the same
room, unless such white and colored
persons are effectually separated by a
solid partition extending from the floor
upward to a distance of seven feet or
higher, and unless a separate entrance
from the street is provided for each
compartment.
It shall be unlawful for colored people
to frequent any park owned or
maintained by the city for the benefit,
use and enjoyment of white persons . . .
and unlawful for any white person to
frequent any park owned or maintained
by the city for the use and benefit of
colored persons.
Any person . . . who shall rent any part
of any such building to a negro person
or a negro family when such building is
already in whole or in part in occupancy
by a white person or white family, or
vice versa when the building is in
occupancy by a negro person or negro
family, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
and on conviction thereof shall be
punished by a fine of not less than
twenty-five ($25.00) nor more than one
hundred ($100.00) dollars or be
imprisoned not less than 10, or more
than 60 days, or both such fine and
imprisonment in the discretion of the
court.

Ferris State Univ., The Origins of Jim Crow, JIM CROW MUSEUM OF RACIST MEMORABILIA (last updated Apr.
2015), http://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/links/misclink/examples/homepage.htm (this project provides examples of Jim
Crow laws affecting different social services) (last visited May 2, 2015).
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New Mexico

Transportation

Texas

Education

The . . . Utilities Commission . . . is
empowered and directed to require the
establishment of separate waiting rooms
at all stations for the white and colored
races.
[The County Board of Education]: shall
provide schools of two kinds; those for
white children and those for colored
children.

In 1896, the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson adopted a policy that prohibited the
two races from mixing in public spaces—like those listed above—to ensure minimal interaction
between the two races.71 In Plessy, the partitioning of the two races in a train was at issue.72 The
Court reasoned that keeping the races apart would be beneficial because it would prevent tension
that may arise from people having to sit with people of another race.73 The ruling in Plessy
signaled the beginning of the justification for the separation of the two races.
This separationist ideology continued well into the twentieth century as local
governments issued laws that banned African Americans from going to the same restrooms,
schools, or other public facilities as their white counterparts.74 In fact, Jim Crow made racial
segregation “mandatory, not permissible or negotiable and was an undeniable expression of state
power.”75
In 1938, however, the Supreme Court provided some expansion in the realm of education
for African-Americans. An African-American student sought to attend an all-white law school in
Missouri.76 Missouri separated the two races into separate schools; however, there was no law
school that African-American students could attend.77 The Court found that Missouri had
deprived a class of individuals the same privileges that it had granted its white students.78 Due to
this discrepancy, the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for the State to deny law school
facilities to African-Americans even if there was little or no demand.79 Furthermore, it was found
to be unconstitutional for the State to require African-American residents to attend law school
out-of-state.80 The Court ordered that if there were to be only a single law school, students of all
races would be eligible for admission.81
Ten years later, two more cases continued to expand accessibility to African-Americans.
In 1946, the Supreme Court ruled that a Virginia law that segregated train passengers was
71

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Id.
73
Id.
74
Welke, supra note 69.
75
Id. at 273.
76
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 342 (1938).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 351.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 352.
81
Id. at 351.
72
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unconstitutional because it placed an undue burden on interstate commerce.82 The Court found
that the Virginia statute in question, which gave train conductors the power to rearrange
passengers to avoid integration, created delays in travel and an inefficient system.83 Furthermore,
the Court found that the policing powers of the state could not extend to control public space
when the activity extended beyond the boundaries of the state.84 Since the transportation of
passengers extended beyond the borders of Virginia, this statute affected the autonomy of the
states surrounding Virginia and made the state law unconstitutional.85
In 1948, the Court overturned a law that prevented African-Americans from purchasing
property in an all-white neighborhood.86 The law in question allowed private individuals to
create covenants on property that virtually prohibited African-Americans from integrating into
communities.87 The Court ultimately reasoned that the “freedom from discrimination by the
States in the enjoyment of property rights was among the basic objectives sought to be
effectuated by the framers of the fourteenth Amendment.”88
These preceding cases, when combined, reveal the Court’s reluctance to accept laws
discriminating against race. The era of Jim Crow began to decline as the Court ruled that
discriminatory efforts to banish African-Americans from observing the same privileges held by
white Americans and participating in the same public spaces was now unconstitutional.
This anti-discrimination policy came to the forefront in the landmark decision, Brown v.
Board of Education. In Brown, the Court ruled that “in the field of public education the doctrine
of ‘separate but equal’ ha[d] no place.”89 The Court further held that “segregation [was] a denial
of the equal protection of the laws.”90 The decision in Brown v. Board of Education dismantled
the Jim Crow era in education, and in 1964 President Johnson signed into law the Civil Rights
Act. This Act expanded on what Brown v. Board of Education had done and guaranteed that
African-Americans, as well as other people of different “race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin,” could not be discriminated against by the government.91 The Civil Rights Act of 1964
ensured that people could access public space that they had been deprived of by the Jim Crow
laws.
D. Ugly Laws
Ugly laws in the United States also controlled public space and criminalized conduct
much like previous historical exclusion laws. Ugly laws targeted people that were seen as
unappealing to society—specifically, people with disabilities. Two cities that enforced Ugly laws
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in the twentieth century were Chicago and Portland. Chicago had one of the first known Ugly
laws. Chicago’s Municipal Code, Section #36034, included an ordinance that stipulated:
No person who is diseased, maimed, mutilated or in any way deformed so as to be
an unsightly, disgusting or improper is to be allowed in or on the public ways or
other public places in this city, or shall therein or thereon expose himself to public
view, under penalty of not less than one dollar nor more than fifty dollars for each
offense.92
In Portland, Oregon, one law provided that “if any crippled, maimed or deformed
person [begged] upon the streets or in any public place, they shall upon conviction
thereof before the Police Court, be fined not less than five dollars nor more than one
hundred dollars.”93 Portland’s law was unique in that it specifically prohibited
panhandling by people with physical disabilities.94 The Portland city council found this
law was necessary to ensure that the city could fight against “paupers and vagabonds.”95
Ugly laws spread to many cities across the country and were enacted with the goal of
preserving the quality of life for cities.96 Many of these laws took on the name of “Unsightly
Beggar Ordinances.”97 In some cities, the local government would pay for citizens who fell
within Ugly law standards to move to another city to ensure that their physical disabilities did not
lower the quality of living within the city limits.98
Ugly laws were met with many efforts to overturn them. As advocates for people with
disabilities increased, states either repealed their laws by legislative action, or discontinued their
enforcement.99 Although many states were encouraged to overturn, repeal, or discontinue
enforcement of the law without intervention from the Supreme Court or Congress, the process
was slow to conclude.100 In 1990, Congress acted to officially end all such discrimination with
the American with Disabilities Act (ADA).101 The Act declared that individuals with disabilities
were a discrete minority who had been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, and “relegated to a position of political powerlessness in
our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting
from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to
participate in, and contribute to, society.”102 The ADA, much like the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
worked to allow people access to public spaces that they had once been denied.
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E. Sundown Towns
Sundown Towns first surfaced in the early twentieth century.103 Just like other historical
exclusion efforts, Sundown Towns aimed to prevent certain individuals from occupying public
space within a town’s geographical borders. In the case of Sundown Towns, these laws were
meant to keep minorities—often times African American, Chinese American, or Hispanics—
from residing in the town.104 This control of public space ensured that many minorities were
either removed from the city’s limits or discouraged from residing within the limits.105
Some of the earliest examples of Sundown Towns had postings on city limit signs
warning minorities from entering or residing in the town. For example, in Rogers, Arkansas, the
city had a sign that said “N—, You Better Not Let the Sun Set on You in Rogers.”106 Local
authorities used these signs to enforce ordinances that prohibited minorities from owning
property.107
While many of the earliest Sundown Town signs targeted African-Americans, as the
phenomenon expanded to other states, towns began to target other racial minorities. For example,
in Colorado, there were signs that said “No Mexicans After Night.”108 In Connecticut, “Whites
Only Within City Limits After Dark.”109 Finally, in Nevada there were signs that prohibited
“Japs” from being within the city.110
The effect of Sundown Towns created more of a social exclusion rather than a legal
exclusion. While some Sundown Towns passed ordinances that prohibited minorities from being
within the city limits or established property covenants limiting land ownership to white
Americans, many relied on the effect of the signs alone to keep people out.111 The effect of these
signs left a dark legacy for many towns. In Anna, Illinois, even as late as 2001, the name Anna
was colloquially understood to stand for “Ain’t No N— Around.”112
Unlike other historical exclusion efforts, Sundown Towns were not directly overturned or
repealed. The disappearance of Sundown Towns flowed incidentally from Supreme Court cases
ruling that restrictive covenants were unconstitutional.113 As stated earlier, the Supreme Court
held that courts could not enforce racial covenants on real estate.114 The Court held that courts
103
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could not enforce these covenants because this would create a state action discriminating against
a group in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.115 Finally, the Supreme Court held that under
the Civil Rights Act of 1968 Congress could regulate the sale of private property in order to
prevent racial discrimination.116 The Court found that Congress’s duty under the Thirteenth
Amendment allowed Congress to bar all public or private racial discrimination in the sale of
property to remedy the final “badges and incidents of slavery.”117
While the Court’s ruling in these two cases invalidated many private covenants and
allowed many minorities an opportunity to live in many all-white cities, most Sundown Towns
continued to make minorities feel unwanted. Whether it was a lynching or sign at the city limits,
most Sundown Towns did not use ordinances to control public space.118 This effect can be seen
as new “Brown Sundown Towns” appear in some Southwestern cities.119 These Brown Sundown
Towns, much like old Sundown Towns, work to limit access to public space. With Brown
Sundown Towns, cities now work to exclude undocumented immigrants.120
The study of historical criminalization laws reveals a framework of public space and
control. Vagrancy Laws and Sundown Towns worked to banish outsiders from establishing
residency within a city. Jim Crow Laws, Anti-Okie Laws, and Ugly Laws worked to remove and
punish undesirable people and prohibit their access to public spaces. Over the past 200 years, the
United States has justified these exclusion laws to protect against lawlessness entering into
public space. Vagrancy and Anti-Okie Laws prevailed for years because state and local
governments relied on historical duties that governments owed to their residents. When looking
at how governments justified these exclusion laws, similarities appear within modern antihomeless ordinances.121 Modern ordinances, when looked at through the framework created with
these historical exclusion laws, begin to look very similar in form and function.
II. MODERN CASE STUDIES
The three case studies below illustrate different ways U.S. cities are implementing new
and inventive methods for removing homeless individuals from public space or criminalizing
their existence within that area. These are only a few examples of ordinances of this kind, and
any state in the nation could provide similar examples to illustrate similar trends.
A. Honolulu, HI
Attempting to ensure the island’s continued popularity as a tourist paradise, city officials
in Honolulu are aggressively targeting the area homeless population. The City Council in
Honolulu, Hawaii has recently adopted an ordinance prohibiting homeless individuals from
sitting or lying down on public sidewalks. This would not be a particularly egregious example of
115
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an anti-homeless ordinance compared to other ordinances aimed at the homeless, except for the
fact that supporters of this new ordinance are transparent about their goal of completely
removing the homeless population from the area.122 Citing the area’s popularity as a tourist
destination, its reputation for good “photo-ops,” and the need to keep tourists coming back, local
leaders believe that the best method for dealing with the homeless “epidemic” in the area is to
first criminalize life-sustaining conduct in public spaces and later move all of the homeless
people off of the island entirely.123 Therefore, one plan to deal with homeless individuals in
Honolulu is to relocate these people to a small industrial island to camp. This island is far out of
the view of tourists, was formerly used as an internment camp during WWII, and contains a large
wastewater facility and former garbage dump.124
As a further indication of how some leaders feel about the issue of homelessness in this
city, Hawaii State representative Tom Bower reportedly walked through the streets of Honolulu
recently with a sledgehammer, and proceeded to smash any shopping cart he could find that he
suspected might be used by a homeless person.125 In addition, Bower has been quoted as saying
he is “disgusted” by homeless people,126 and admits to walking around Waikiki and waking up
sleeping homeless people and telling them “Get your ass moving!”127
B. Clearwater, FL
City officials in Clearwater, Florida have a similar plan to push the homeless population
out of their city. Once again, the new ordinances they have adopted are similar to many
ordinances around the country, as these new laws commonly prohibit sitting and lying down in
public areas.128 Like in Waikiki, city officials in Clearwater are also transparent about their intent
to drive the local homeless population elsewhere.129 In addition to passing new ordinances and
verbally supporting the removal of the homeless, city officials are also shutting off the water at
public spigots, welding the doors shut at public bathrooms, and discouraging the distribution of
free food, even though the city does not have sufficient shelter beds to accommodate the
homeless in the area.130 The city has not only refrained from opening or expanding any shelter
facilities; it is actually reducing financial support to existing shelters, resulting in closures.131
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Clearwater officials’ plan to remove homeless people from their city has been likened to
“squeezing a balloon.”132 One city official characterized the city’s efforts as the elimination of
services that have become “public enablers” for homeless people.133 As part of the city’s plan to
push homeless people out of Clearwater, violators of certain anti-homeless ordinances are given
the choice between jail time and being admitted into an emergency shelter in another city.134A
consultant hired by the city for $25,000 says that these measures are necessary to end the city’s
“history of enablement.”135
A number of documents acquired through public records requests were recently produced
by the City of Clearwater.136 Among these was a City document titled, “Some of the tools
officers can utilize to limit the socially undesirable behaviors that an individual, including a
homeless person, may sometimes exhibit in public are as follows:” followed by a list of 28 city
ordinances and federal statutes that the City finds useful to criminalize area homeless
individuals. Another City document revealed that, although a housed individual in violation of
one of these ordinances would be issued a notice to appear, a homeless individual is given the
choice between jail time and immediate forced admission to the area shelter.137 Homeless people
in the area reportedly call the Pinellas Safe Harbor shelter facility the “jailter” because it is run
by prison guards and is on the prison grounds138 and likely due to the fact that many homeless
individuals are brought there in the back of a police car.
C. Burien, WA139
The targeted criminalization of area
homeless individuals in Burien recently
gained national attention. A recent ordinance
passed in Burien, Washington is a particularly
egregious and shocking example of a city’s
attempt to remove homeless people from
public spaces. The city passed a trespass
ordinance that would be enforced if a person
were determined to have a “hygiene or scent
that is unreasonably offensive.”140 Once a
person is cited for trespass under this
ordinance, even if it is just for smelling a
certain way, that person is now subject to
132
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criminal punishment for returning to the area of the original issuance.141 The ACLU of
Washington immediately spoke out about the unconstitutional vagueness and arbitrariness of the
ordinance.142 After the ACLU sent a cease and desist order to the City of Burien, city officials
agreed to reconsider the ordinance’s odor provision in light of the negative press and public
outrage the ordinance generated.143
Some Burien officials claim that the odor ordinance was not proposed to target the
homeless, but rather to address residents’ concerns about feeling “intimidated” in public
places.144 To justify this new proposed ordinance, which also targets “boisterous” behavior, a
city official cited the need for people to feel safe in places where they bring their children.145 One
Burien councilmember, who reportedly was the only one to vote against the proposed ordinance,
believes that the ordinance appeared to be an attempt to target a group of local homeless youth
who are largely “kids of color,” raising concerns that the ordinance is largely a response to local
residents’ personal fears.146 Unlike most other homeless criminalization ordinances, Burien’s
odor ordinance has failed to appear neutral in the eyes of the public, resulting in the kind of
public response that proponents of homeless criminalization efforts naturally attempt to avoid.
Even with the apparent removal of Burien’s odor provision in ordinance 606, the
remaining language now codified in Burien’s ordinance 621 is still described by homeless rights
advocates as “a recipe for discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement” due to its targeting of
homeless individuals.147 Recent extensive research reveals further concerns with the City of
Burien’s targeted criminalization methods.148 For example, Burien’s municipal code contains a
provision that gives the City the discretion to decide to choose either a civil infraction or a
criminal misdemeanor charge against any violation of a civil ordinance, allowing for problematic
discriminatory enforcement.149
These three case studies are just a few, brief examples of how cities are using the new
criminalization ordinances to achieve the same goals that were sought under the old historical
exclusion laws. Although some cities are explicit about their motivations, while others cite
different justifications, the overall goal of these modern homeless criminalization ordinances are
141
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the same. The goal is the removal of homeless people from sight. Although the specific language
of the old laws and the new laws may appear different on their face, historical exclusion laws and
the new homeless criminalization ordinances are actually very similar as applied.
III. SHIFT FROM HISTORICAL EXCLUSION LAWS TO MODERN ORDINANCES
Historical exclusion laws were eventually struck down by the courts as
unconstitutional.150 Some challenges to the constitutionality of the archaic laws were successful
by showing that the law (1); violated the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment
clause by punishing a person’s status (e.g., poor, drug addict, destitute, jobless) rather than their
conduct,151 (2); was unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth amendment Due Process
Clause by providing insufficient notice of the conduct to be prohibited,152 and/or (3); failed to
provide adequate standards leading to unfettered and discriminatory enforcement discretion by
police.153
The loss of historical exclusion laws led cities to seek new methods to achieve the
removal of unwanted groups of people. Often influenced by an emerging theory called “Broken
Windows,” cities passed laws that were meant to avoid constitutionality challenges, while still
providing the same enforcement power to exclude.154
A. How Historical Exclusion Laws Led to Modern Criminalization Ordinances
The fall of historical exclusion laws led to the creation of the modern criminalization
ordinances that are enforced against homeless people today.155 The following is an example of
the type of vagrancy law that was prevalent in the U.S. before the civil rights movement:
All persons . . . who have no visible means of living, who in ten days do not seek
employment, nor labor when employment is offered to them, all healthy beggars,
who travel with written statements of their misfortunes, all persons who roam
about from place to place without any lawful business, all lewd and dissolute
persons who live in and about houses of Ill-Fame; all . . . common drunkards may
be committed to jail and sentenced to hard labor for such time as the Court, before
whom they are convicted shall think proper, not exceeding ninety days.156
These laws often classified “vagrants” as “drunkards,” “pilferers,” “runaways,” “idle or
disorderly persons,” “lewd or wanton persons,” and/or those who “neglect their employment.”157
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Vagrancy laws provided police officers an effective tool for the removal of unwanted
people from public space because of the broad discretion the officers were granted by the
wording of the statute. First, the officer had the discretion to decide whether a person’s actions
were in violation of the law, but the description of the prohibited conduct was ambiguous and
required a subjective determination by the officer. For example, the officer had the discretion to
decide who was “drunk,” who was “not seeking employment,” or who was “roaming or
wandering.”158 Second, the officer also had the discretion to classify a person based on his or her
visible status. A person could be considered in violation of the law entirely based on who they
were or how they looked. For example, the officer could decide who appeared “lewd or
dissolute,” “unemployed,” like a “common drunkard,” or other similar classifications that might
fall under the wording of the law.159 These vagrancy laws were eventually struck down as
unconstitutional due to their vagueness and the determination that they afforded police too much
discretion in deciding who to cite.160
In addition to the unconstitutional degree of discretion afforded to police under such
laws, these laws were also commonly found unconstitutional because they did not provide
sufficient notice as to what conduct would constitute a violation of the statute.161 A Jacksonville,
Florida statute was struck down for criminalizing “nightwalking,” “loafing,” and “wandering and
strolling” because the court determined that a person of normal intelligence would not know
whether he or she was in violation of the statute while simply walking down the street.162 The
overbreadth of the old vagrancy laws therefore ran afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process clause requirement for proper notice of prohibited conduct.163
Following the repeal of these historical exclusion laws after the civil rights movement,
cities began enacting civil ordinances that avoided the issue of unconstitutionality by more
specifically describing the “conduct” or “behavior” to be prohibited.164 Examples of the more
contemporary conduct-specific laws include sit-and-lie ordinances, sidewalk obstruction
ordinances, anti-camping ordinances, prohibitions on storing private property in public places,
public urination and defecation ordinances, park exclusion orders, panhandling ordinances,
prohibitions on sleeping in vehicles, public nuisance laws, and loitering with “intent” ordinances.
While vagrancy statutes were previously determined unconstitutional for criminalizing
people who appeared “lewd,” “wanton,” or “unemployed,” contemporary ordinances have
largely avoided constitutional challenges by not characterizing the types of people who will be
found in violation of the law. Where vagrancy laws criminalized “wandering” or “idleness,” new
ordinances criminalize “sitting,” “camping,” and “panhandling.”165 This attempt to increase the
language specificity for the conduct to be prohibited is an effort to avoid the issue of facial
unconstitutionality, and an attempt to resolve the issue associated with the requirement for
adequate notice. Although this new more conduct-specific language (e.g., sitting, lying down,
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panhandling) attempts to remove the ambiguity that was present in vagrancy laws, many believe
that the new ordinances still contain ambiguity. This statutory evolution is a clear response to the
loss of historical exclusion laws and the facial unconstitutionality challenges they faced.
While the increased language specificity of modern criminalization ordinances attempts
to evade Due Process challenges, the more specific new ordinance language also restricts the
effectiveness of these laws as a broad tool for law enforcement officers. Vagrancy laws provided
officers one umbrella statute to utilize in many different situations due to the broad and
ambiguous language of the statute. The new ordinances’ specific language requires a person to
perform the listed conduct in order to be found in violation of the law, in theory allowing less
room for unfettered and discriminatory enforcement discretion. Responding to the loss of the allencompassing vagrancy law method, cities have resorted to adopting a variety of ordinances that
criminalize a wide range of behaviors. Instead of having one broad vagrancy law to use as an
enforcement tool to remove individuals from public space, cities have adopted many different
ordinances to achieve similar results. This new multiple ordinance approach has helped law
enforcement regain the broad discretion that they were previously allowed under historical
exclusion laws.166
The increase in the statutory language specificity of prohibited conduct does not mean
that the categories of prohibited conduct are narrowly tailored. Categories of prohibited conduct
such as sitting, lying down, relieving oneself, and storing of personal property in public are
arguably less ambiguous than prior statutory language. Even if modern criminalization
ordinances do contain less ambiguity, they still remain extremely broad in terms of what they
restrict. For someone who has no home and no place to stay, it is very difficult not to violate
these ordinances because these laws restrict the conduct of life-sustaining activities. The result of
this use of combined modern criminalization ordinances is broad enforcement discretion
comparable to what was exercised under the historical exclusion law regime.
To further understand the shift from historical exclusion laws to modern criminalization
ordinances, it is helpful to consider the theory behind the modern criminalization regime and the
policy goals it advocates. In the post-civil rights era, new tools in the form of criminalization
ordinances allowed cities to begin implementing an enforcement regime influenced by a theory
called “Broken Windows.”
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B. Broken Windows Theory167
Today’s laws have their roots in the broken-windows theory which holds that one
poor person in a neighborhood is like a first unrepaired broken window and if
such a “window” is not immediately fixed or removed, it is a signal that no one
cares, disorder will flourish and the community will go to hell in a hand basket. A
direct outcome of this theory is the introduction of legislation to criminalize the
presence of homeless people in public.168
The Broken Windows Theory has
shaped the policing strategies in many cities
since the early 1990’s, and the overall strategy
is one of zero-tolerance.169 The theory asserts
that the catalyst for the overall decline of an
area is one “broken window” or a similar sign
that the area has cosmetic defects, such as
graffiti. If the window is not immediately fixed,
the theory suggests that others will likely break
more windows, spray more graffiti, and leave trash in the streets because they will see the area as
a place where such behavior is tolerated. Next, Broken Windows Theory proponents believe that
the concerned residents become fearful and move out or withdraw from these public spaces,
resulting in the loss of social control.170 Next, this theory suggests that organized crime and
serious criminal actors seek out neighborhoods that appear to be in disorder or disrepair.171 The
cycle of crime and poverty is believed to have been set in motion, and more serious crime will
inevitably envelop the area.172 This is why the Broken Windows Theory recommends that the
very first broken window should be “fixed” immediately in order to avoid the inevitable
landslide of criminality that will otherwise follow.173
In practice, the Broken Windows approach often begins with a law enforcement crackdown on small misdemeanor offenses and less serious crimes in order to cut-off the potential for
an area to fall into disrepair in the first place.174 This focus on petty crimes suggests that high
crime areas are a result of an initial period of unchecked low level crimes or an appearance of
disrepair or dirtiness. The application of the Broken Windows Theory to the issue of
homelessness often results in the assertion that the presence of homeless people in a
neighborhood leads to high levels of serious crime. This theory, therefore, acts as a justification
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for the forcible removal of the homeless population from a geographic area as the first step in
restoring social order and regaining desirable aesthetic qualities.
The Broken Windows approach has come under increasing scrutiny. With the recent
killings of several African Americans at the hands of police officers who were attempting to
prevent relatively petty crimes, the policing strategy of cracking down on minor offences has
many people contemplating the costs associated with such an approach.175 Others assert that this
Broken Windows approach is simply a tool used by law enforcement to discriminate against
marginalized groups such as racial minorities and the homeless.176 If the persistence of
homelessness in America is any indication, it appears that this theory has not helped to alleviate
the homeless problem.
C. Criminalizing Homelessness in Washington State
The following is an example of a former Washington State vagrancy law:
Be it enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Washington, That
the following persons are vagrants: All persons who tell fortunes, or where lost
and stolen goods may be found; all common prostitutes, and keepers of bawdy
houses or houses for the resort of prostitutes; al habitual drunkards, gamesters, or
other disorderly persons; all persons wandering about and having no visible
calling, or business to maintain themselves; all persons going about as collectors
of alms for charitable institutions under any false, or fraudulent pre- tenses; all
persons playing or betting in any street or public or open place, at, or with any
table or instrument of gaming at any game or pretended game of chance.177
A number of varieties of criminalizing ordinances have emerged in Washington State cities to
replace old vagrancy laws such as the one quoted above. Considering that the Broken Windows
Theory has at its core an aesthetic “clean-up the neighborhood” element, cities such as Seattle
have used this theory to justify the control of public space. The new criminalization ordinances
largely focus on prohibiting specified conduct, and the consequences usually involve the
violator’s exclusion from a specified geographic area. Rather than an attempt to remedy the issue
(presumably the prohibited conduct), cities appear to be predominantly concerned with moving
violators of the ordinances out of certain areas, and inevitably moving them into another area.178
For example, Seattle has many options to draw from in order to remove “undesirable”
people from public spaces including new types of criminalization ordinances such as a sit and lie
ordinance,179 a sleeping in public spaces ordinance,180 parks exclusion orders,181 an aggressive
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panhandling ordinance,182 a sidewalk obstruction ordinance,183 an anti-camping ordinance,184 a
public urination/defecation ordinance,185 and a storage of personal property on public property
ordinance.186 While Washington’s historical vagrancy laws were eventually struck down because
they granted police officers too much discretion to decide who to cite, the new laundry list of
ordinance options provided to officers allows them to choose which ordinance to use to either fit
a particular situation or to achieve a desired result. Although the new ordinances may appear
more specific regarding the conduct they prohibit, now a variety of tools exist for a city to
choose from, resulting in a similar degree of discretion as was allowed under historical exclusion
laws.
A recent comprehensive report on Washington’s homeless criminalization ordinances
reveals a number of problematic issues with the criminalization method.187 One of the most
concerning issues with many modern criminalization ordinances is the civil/criminal legal
distinction of an ordinance. While classifying an ordinance as civil rather than criminal may
appear to some as a sign of lenience, the actual effect is a relaxation of due process for those
cited under the civil ordinance.188 Due to the civil classification of the citation, the homeless
person cited (1) loses the right to legal representation, (2) loses the right to a jury trial, and (3) is
often cited for a later criminal charge due to the failure to pay a fine.189 Some cities have
reportedly been changing criminal ordinances to civil ordinances because many homeless
individuals, given their day in court, prevail due to sympathetic juries.190
Another recent report on the intersectionality of homelessness and other marginalized
groups reveals some often-unseen discriminatory issues that arise under Washington’s homeless
criminalization practices.191 This report shows that racial minorities, women, veterans, LGBTQ
individuals, individuals with mental disabilities, and incarcerated individuals are all
disproportionately represented in the homeless population, and are therefore disproportionately
affected by homeless criminalization ordinances.192
In addition to the discriminatory nature of these ordinances, another recent report on the
cost of homeless criminalization reveals that this method is both extremely expensive and
ineffective at reducing recidivism rates.193 This comprehensive cost analysis reveals the
enormous costs cities in Washington incur in their efforts to criminalize homelessness, and also
provides examples of cities around the country that have reduced those costs by implementing
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alternative programs to address homelessness.194 Considering that Washington’s homeless
criminalization ordinances are largely aimed at geographic banishment, a comparison to former
historical laws that shared this goal reveals problematic similarities between the two types of
laws.
IV. CRIMINALIZATION: WE’VE TRIED AND REJECTED THIS BEFORE
The ordinances that are disproportionately enforced upon homeless people are now
written differently than previous unconstitutional laws. Where former vagrancy laws were
lengthy and contained multiple prohibited conducts, the new criminalization ordinances are
purported to be more brief and specific. Where vagrancy laws contained ambiguous
characterizations and allowed subjective discretion, new ordinances claim to target specified
conduct and do not name the groups or types of people who are targeted. Although some of the
apparent facial similarities between historical and modern criminalization laws may have been
removed, these two types of laws are similar as applied.
In order to understand the comparison between the historical exclusion laws and the
modern homeless criminalization ordinances, it is important to explain the scope of the
comparison. Historical exclusion laws were often broad and all encompassing, and therefore only
one law was required to accomplish the enforcement goals of a city. The modern ordinances are
commonly more direct and specific, and therefore cities often enact multiple ordinances to
accomplish their enforcement goals. Therefore, when comparing the historical exclusion laws to
the modern criminalization ordinances, the comparison is not between a single historical law and
any one modern ordinance, but rather between a historical law and the collective group of
modern ordinances a city possesses. Using this comparison, it is possible to see the similarities
between these two types of enforcement strategies as applied.
A. Similarities Between Modern and Historical Criminalization Efforts
The men and women out here, they don’t want to be homeless…I don’t care how
broken down you are, not one person out on the street wants to be homeless. And
to be penalized for being homeless? ... You got to go to the back of the bus, you
can’t come into certain restaurants, you can’t go to the bathroom…it’s already a
system that needs a lot of work.195
Comparing historical exclusion laws with the modern homeless criminalization ordinance
regime exposes four distinct similarities between the historical repealed laws and the new
ordinances: both legal tools (1) disproportionately affect one marginalized group of people; (2)
result in unavoidable violations by the targeted group; (3) remove all practicable options from
the targeted group; and (4) seek to remove the targeted group from sight.
First, modern criminalization ordinances do not affect all citizens equally. A law that
criminalizes begging does not affect the wealthy and the homeless equally. Laws that prohibit
storing private property in public or public urination do not equally affect someone who owns a
194
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home. Similar to the historical exclusion laws that were found to be unconstitutional, these
ordinances do not have an equitable impact.
In practice, modern criminalization ordinances only affect one marginalized group of
people. Jim Crow laws were passed specifically to affect African Americans. Ugly laws were
meant to restrict the conduct or geographic location of those who were deemed “unsightly,”
“repulsive,” or “ugly,” and disproportionately targeted disabled people. Anti-Okie laws
specifically targeted migrant workers, and Sundown Town laws targeted racial minorities.
Therefore, one of the most identifiable characteristics of these various historical exclusion laws
was that they disproportionately impacted a marginalized group or groups.
Although a law that prohibits sitting or lying down on a sidewalk facially prohibits all
people from sitting or lying down on the sidewalk, there are a few reasons why the law in
practice disproportionately targets the homeless. Police have the ability to selectively enforce
these laws. The typical enforcement of this type of ordinance is not the citation of a man in a
business suit enjoying his brownbag lunch on the curb outside his favorite café. Armed with this
type of ordinance, a police officer instead may selectively enforce such a law in order to address
complaints by local business owners. Moreover, as an alternative to eating his lunch on the curb,
the man in the business suit has other options of places to sit that are unavailable to the homeless
individual. Once again, because those who do not appear homeless have the option to sit inside
various establishments, this type of law only affects the homeless in practice. Similar to the
unconstitutional historical exclusion laws, modern ordinances only affect one targeted group of
people.
Second, aside from the problems of the unequal applicability of these ordinances and
their targeted creation, there is also an issue with a homeless person’s ability to obey the law
because of their circumstances. Vagrancy laws made criminals of those who were determined to
be poor or unemployed simply because they were poor or unemployed. Therefore, it was not
possible for a “vagrant” to comply with the law, resulting in a violation based on their
circumstances alone. Considering that the new criminalization ordinances prohibit life-sustaining
activities such as sitting, lying down, sleeping, urinating, eating, and storing belongings,
homeless people in the area actually cannot comply with the laws.196 In effect, a homeless person
is made a criminal simply because they have no reasonable alternatives but to perform such
conduct in public. Therefore, similar to the unconstitutional vagrancy laws, these modern
ordinances effectively criminalize a person’s status.
Third, the wide coverage of life-sustaining activities the modern ordinances prohibit
result in a lack of options for homeless individuals. In the abstract, the typical historical vagrancy
law would require a poor person to either immediately lift themselves from poverty or to leave
the city in order to comply with the statute. Similarly, a Sundown Town law would require a
racial minority to leave the city in order to avoid non-compliance. Therefore, the lack of options
created by the law was common among the historical exclusion laws. Considering many cities’
lack of available shelter beds197 and the fact that cities are divided into private property and
public land, how can a homeless person comply with an ordinance that prohibits them from
196
197

Id.
Id.

23

The Wrong Side of History

May 2015

“camping” on public property? How can a homeless person avoid violating a public urination
ordinance if there are no public restrooms provided in the area? The combined effect of the
various ordinances and the lack of services in the area create a situation in which a homeless
individual is unable to legally exist in the city and must therefore relocate to another city. To
further follow the chain of events, if neighboring cities similarly have criminalization ordinances
and a lack of available services, the homeless individual is without viable options to legally
survive in his or her new location. Similar to the unconstitutional laws that have been struckdown, modern criminalization ordinances result in a lack of options for the targeted marginalized
group.
Finally, modern criminalization ordinances attempt to remove a specific “undesirable”
group from sight.198 Jim Crow, Anti-Okie, Sundown Town, and Ugly laws, based on their
explicit language, were all drafted to exclude specific marginalized groups from a geographical
area or from public space. Because these historical laws criminalized one’s presence in a
specified area, and the only option for compliance was to leave that area, a common
characteristic of these laws was their goal of removing targeted groups from sight. The
prevalence of exclusion orders and the evidence shown in the case studies indicates that the
overall policy goal of the modern homeless criminalization ordinance regime is the removal of
homeless individuals from the city. This is a very different and less admirable goal than the
eradication of homelessness. This policy goal of physical removal is another way in which the
homeless criminalization ordinances are the same as the unconstitutional historical exclusion
laws that have been struck down.
B. Trends to Overturn Historical Exclusion Laws
The effects of many of the historical exclusion laws were felt decades after their
implementation. While the efforts of advocates in response to historical exclusion laws caused
local authorities to stop enforcing many of the punishments, in most instances, it was not until
judicial and legislative efforts intervened that many of these laws ceased to operate.
Many of the exclusion laws that were overturned by the Supreme Court were found to
violate some fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. In Edwards, the Court said that
denying vagrants the right to travel from state to state violated their right to “life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness.” In Brown, the Court ruled that denying African-American children the
opportunity to a proper education denied them the right to be a well-equipped member of our
society.
The Supreme Court, in striking down these laws, has looked beyond the conduct that the
law is prohibiting. Not only is the Court looking at the purpose of the law, but they are also
looking at the consequences of the law. In its rulings, the Court has found that many of these
laws have detrimental effects on the groups being criminalized.
In the same vein, Congress and state legislatures have also found that the legislation in
question violated a fundamental right. Specifically, looking at the American with Disabilities
Act, Congress acknowledges that people with disabilities had become a marginalized group that
198
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had lost its political voice and power. State legislatures and local governments refusing to
enforce ordinances like those found in Sundown towns also showed that a fundamental right of a
group was being limited.
Finally, one trend in the reasoning to overturn historical exclusion laws was the
acknowledgement that many of these laws had historical roots. Sometimes the roots were found
in earlier American legislation or cases, and in the case of Anti-Okie laws, were found to have
English ties. Each time one of these laws was overturned, however, the Court or legislators found
that it was time to move away from those roots: they focused on societal change from when these
discriminatory laws were first accepted. These laws needed to be overturned because later
generations found they were on the wrong side of history.
C. The Shift in Public Opinion on Historical Criminalization Efforts
This section will explore the common phenomenon of a shift in public support after a
discriminatory law is determined to be unconstitutional. Historical exclusion laws commonly
enjoyed at least moderate, if not widespread, support during their creation and implementation;
however, when these laws are determined to be unconstitutional, public support often drops
drastically.199
For example, Jim Crow laws institutionalized racial discrimination against African
American citizens for a century after slavery ended.200 After such a long period of time, the
political will and societal pressure was not able bring about the repeal of these archaic laws until
the 1960’s and 1970’s.201 Although it took a long time to repeal these laws and there was fierce
opposition from proponents of racial discrimination, eventually public opinion shifted in the
post-Jim Crow era concerning the former discriminatory laws.202
Some public opinion polls suggest increasing rejection of racially discriminatory laws.
Although it is difficult to find public opinion statistics relating specifically to the repeal of
historical discriminatory laws, general polls gauging society’s historical and current trends can
be helpful to show dramatic shifts in societal beliefs. While a 1958 poll showed that 94% of
white Americans disapproved of interracial marriages between African Americans and whites, a
2013 poll indicated that now 13% of whites disapprove of the same marital union.203 This poll
suggests an 81% shift in less than 60 years, showing how public opinion can change once a
discriminatory regime is determined impermissible. Similar polls show that 33% of white
Americans are still dissatisfied with the treatment of African Americans today, and 51% of white
Americans support affirmative action for racial minorities.204 Though not specifically related to
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the historical discriminatory laws, these statistics indicate a shift in public opinion over the
course of a generation.
Similar polls suggest comparable shifts in public opinion concerning issues such as
disability rights, women’s rights, and LGBTQ rights. While Ugly Laws historically acted as a
blanket ban on disabled individuals’ presence in society, subsequent legal challenges and current
legal efforts continue to push for the expansion of disability rights. Currently, constitutional
challenges are emerging across the country to enable marriage equality. This is likely to be the
next example of a dramatic shift in public support for a historically marginalized group.205 206
Recent polls have shown 55% support nationwide for gay marriage, compared to 32% in 1996.207
The comparison of homelessness to these other historically marginalized groups is not
meant to suggest that each faces the same struggles and issues. Still, these examples do suggest
that public education and advocacy are key to protecting the basic civil and constitutional rights
of homeless Americans. Although these shifts in public opinion on discriminatory practices often
take far longer than they should, eventually these former practices are looked back upon with
shame and regret. Considering the harsh and targeted consequences of the modern homeless
criminalization ordinance, society will likely similarly look back on its former treatment of
vulnerable individuals with regret and disbelief.
D. Predictions Based on Historical Criminalization Rejections
Previous sections in this brief established that (1) modern homeless criminalization
ordinances are fundamentally similar to unconstitutional historical exclusion laws, and (2) public
opinion shifts once a law is exposed as discriminatory. More recently, a handful of modern
criminalization ordinances have been successfully challenged on constitutional grounds, perhaps
indicating the beginning of a line of precedent for challenging homeless criminalization
ordinances.208 Considering that the majority of society looks back at historical discriminatory
laws with disgust and disbelief, and considering how similar anti-homeless ordinances are in
function and purpose to these historical examples, proponents of anti-homeless laws are on the
wrong side of history.
Although the modern criminalization ordinances initially appeared to successfully avoid
the type of legal challenges that brought about the repeal of historical exclusion laws, there have
been a number of more recent cases that have exposed the potential unconstitutional features of
modern ordinances.209 These successful constitutional legal arguments included showings of
Fourteenth Amendment lack of notice and discriminatory enforcement practices,210 violations of
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substantive due process and freedom of association rights,211 and Fourth Amendment violations
for random stops and searches and destruction of personal property.212 These successful
constitutional challenges expose the legal susceptibility of these ordinances, but political will and
public knowledge of the issue are still necessary components of a successful social movement to
repeal discriminatory laws.
For now, the language of modern criminalization ordinances appears to have curbed
much of the public outcry that opposed laws such as Ugly Laws, Jim Crow laws, and Sundown
Town laws. By adopting ordinances that do not explicitly name “homeless people” as the target,
proponents of the criminalization method are able to keep the discriminatory nature of the laws
under the radar to a large extent. Still, advocacy efforts by organizations that fight for homeless
rights continue to bring this issue into the public eye.
The modern homeless criminalization ordinances are, in practice, the same as the old
vagrancy laws, Jim Crow laws, Ugly Laws, Sundown Town laws, and Anti-Okie laws. These
historical laws have all been found unconstitutional, and have therefore been repealed. Although
there was popular support for these laws before their repeal, they now are looked back on by the
vast majority of society as objectionable, cruel, and discriminatory. Considering their similarity
to these historical exclusion laws, modern homeless criminalization ordinances will be similarly
evaluated—and rejected—in the near future.
CONCLUSION
Historical exclusion laws and modern anti-homeless ordinances work to punish the
conduct of people seen as undesirable by society. The conduct in and of itself is not criminal.
The criminalization of homelessness shares many similarities with the criminalization of many
other groups throughout history. Historical exclusion laws worked, just like anti-homeless
ordinances, to prohibit groups of people from having access to public spaces within towns or
cities. The purpose of excluding them was to limit their ability to engage in the same public
spheres as the groups that these laws targeted.
Anti-homeless laws are detrimental to the homeless population in the United States. For
now, modern criminalization ordinances remain the principle means by which cities attempt to
control the homeless population. Similar to their predecessors, these ordinances are often not
narrowly tailored to advance public health or safety, but instead they function as tools to
physically remove homeless people from public space. The purging of homeless people is not an
attempt to end homelessness. It is an attempt to control and define who has access to public
space. Anti-homeless ordinances truly share the same criminalizing and marginalizing effect as
historical exclusion laws. It is not difficult to imagine society looking back at ordinances that
criminalized homeless people for sitting down, sleeping, and other life sustaining activities, and
regretting them—like historical exclusion laws.
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